A few weeks ago, the Taiwanese people elected Lai Ching-te as the next president of their republic, rebuking both Chinese influence on public opinion and the vague threats issued by the CCP when it comes to electing candidates from the Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This election, the eighth installment of free and fair presidential selections in Taiwan, marked a particularly contentious three-way race between Ching-te, Hou Yu-ih, the Kuomintang (KMT) candidate, and Ko Wen-je, a third party candidate nominated by the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).
Any understanding of the Taiwanese electoral process depends not just on a geopolitical or socioeconomic understanding of the de facto independent nation, however; in every discussion of Taiwan, China, the United States, and “cross-strait” relations stand as elephants in the proverbial room. In provoking the “sleeping giant” by being a political representation of its polar opposites, Taiwan stands to lose its right to independence and freedom, while modern democracy risks one of its only bulwarks against the rising influence of China globally.
Many of these issues stem from how Taiwan formed a nation identity, and as an entity wholly independent from the rest of China. Taiwan has largely been a colonial possession for much of history, first under the Dutch and Spanish until 1668, then Qing-Dynasty China until 1895, and finally under the Japanese Empire until 1945. During the final portion of Taiwan’s colonial rule, the island was made into a model colony by the imperially ambitious Japanese, who sought to dominate the Chinese, among other ethnic minorities, on the island. Mainland China, which claimed hegemony over the island for the previous two centuries, had its own series of conflicts.
A brutal struggle for independence began in 1911, a civil war fought between the Nationalist and Marxist forces. Apart from a brief interregnum during the Second World War, this conflict lasted till 1949, when the Marxist forces led by Mao Tse-tung won, forcing the nationalists to flee to Taiwan with their leader Chiang Kai-shek. Kai-shek’s despotic government was recognized as the true government of China until the 1970s, when changing economic realities brought international recognition to the mainland, though Taiwan has since seen a re-emergence onto the world stage after holding its first democratic elections in 1987 and subsidizing the semi-state run chip manufacturer TSMC.
The latter has made the once economically inconsequential island of vital importance during the current computing and AI revolutions. Over 90% of the world’s advanced chips are made in Taiwan. This one fact has served as the most significant hurdle for China, who has always seen Taiwan as a prize to be re-conquered. In producing a vital commodity, Taiwan creates an impenetrable shield, as any prospective power looking to establish a foothold in the island against Taiwanese will risks setting themselves, not to mention the world, years back in technological development.
Taiwan has always been like Tantalus’ fruit for China: ever out of reach. Every generation of Chinese leader has promised the citizenry that Taiwan is theirs, and that a re-conquest of the island is on the horizon, despite the fact that any conflict for the island risks becoming a global one. Behind closed doors, though, even top Chinese officials seek peaceful means, rather than outright conflict. To them, a deferential Taiwan, conveyed via global alignment with China and a shift away from the influence of the United States, is a realistic, acceptable representation of that promise.
Historically, the KMT has been the party of moderation, seeking an intermediate position. They represent the status quo, the party of nationalists that China largely has a playbook to deal with. The DPP, the first party to emerge from the ending of martial law in 1987, and the current winning party, represents to China a rebuking of their peace offering. To the new generation of Taiwanese, ever-hopeful of a peaceful full rather than de-facto independence, however, these representations are seemingly flipped; the KMT is not seen as a party of moderation, but rather as working with and leaning to close to the threat that lies on the other side of the Taiwan strait. These results, as well as the entry of a contentious third party that drew votes away from both established coteries, heavily influenced the results of this election. In many ways, the election was thus also a generational battle between old and new Taiwan, representative of a generational change.
Ching-te’s victory over Hou Yu-ih, the KMT candidate, though a reproach of China, does not serve as a beckoning for a larger-scale conflict in the region. Far more contentious forces are more likely to create a fire of the powder keg, such as the territorial demarcation situation in the South China Sea, or China’s encroachment upon the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. Despite these risks, however, the Taiwanese people have remained hopeful, as always, that conflict can be avoided through peaceful and democratic means. Ching-te’s victory is a visible representation of the fact that democratic principles can prove victorious, even with larger powers lurking. As the now-President of Taiwan says, “Peace is our destination; democracy is our compass.”
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